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ABSTRACT
Online social networks are used frequently by many people: Stay-
ing in contact with friends and sharing experiences with them is
very important. However, users are increasingly concerned that
their data will end up in the hands of strangers or that personal
data may even be misused. Secure OSNs can help. These often
use different types of encryption to keep the communication be-
tween the participants incomprehensible to outsiders. However,
participants in such social networks cannot be sure that their data
is secure. Various approaches show that even harmless-looking
metadata, such as the number of contacts of users, can be eval-
uated to draw conclusions about the users and their communica-
tion. These attack methods are analyzed, and existing secure OSNs
are examined, whether these attack methods can be utilized to vi-
olate the user’s privacy. To prevent these privacy attacks, proto-
cols for a secure centralized OSN are developed. Metadata is ob-
scured in the presented OSM and end-to-end encryption is used
for secure communication between clients. Additionally, commu-
nication channels are concealed using mix networks such that ad-
versaries cannot determine which user is accessing which data or
which user is communicating with whom even with access to the
server.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Security services; Software and ap-
plication security; Pseudonymity, anonymity and untrace-
ability; Privacy-preserving protocols.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Many online social networks (OSNs) vie for the users’ favor. They
offer different unique selling propositions to make the user experi-
ence as good as possible so that users spend a lot of time on social
networks. In many OSNs, money is earned through advertising,
the more users are on the network and the longer they stay there,
the greater the advertising income. These can be increased even
further if personalized advertising is displayed. This is tailored to
the respective user and increases the likelihood that they will re-
act to the advertising and thus increases the profit of the network
operators. In doing so, users also lose their anonymity. This per-
sonalized advertising is only possible by evaluating the profiles,
contacts, reactions to messages in the social networks, etc. On the
one hand, these practices are a thorn in the eye of many users and
they are therefore increasingly avoiding these social networks. Fur-
thermore, it is often not only the operator of a social network that
analyzes the personal data, but also third parties, provided they
have access to it. These third parties can do harmless things with
the data, but they can also display malicious behavior and misuse
the collected data for personal theft, for example. and they report
this causes a rethinking of many users and they therefore register
in social networks that supposedly protect their privacy. This often
results in a type of encrypted communication. But apart from the
communication, the privacy can be attacked and the sovereignty
of the users over their data undermined if the communication is
encrypted and user profiles are protected, but the metadata is ana-
lyzed.
Our Contribution
Our contribution is a summary of possible privacy leakages in se-
cure and privacy preserving online chats and online social net-
works. Additionally, an analysis of different privacy preserving
OSNs is given, according to the privacy leakages. Following these
findings, protocols are presented to create concealed channels be-
tween participants in an OSN, which relys on a client-server archi-
tecture. These concealed channels work comparable to mix net-
work . These channels provide end-to-end encrypted communi-
cation between two or more participants and further do not leak
any evaluable metadata to the service provider of the OSN or an-
other attacker. Using concealed channels different possibilities are
presented to provide the functionalities, an OSN should provide.
These are, for example, profiles of the users, private messages be-
tween two or more participants, and discussion groups. The pre-
sented approach of a secure and privacy preserving OSN, then, is
analyzed in detail, whether the possible privacy leakages are pre-
vented.
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Organization of the Paper
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2.1 summarizes differ-
ent approaches to analyze metadata in online social networks and
encrypted communication channels. Based on these works, possi-
ble leackages are displayed in Section 2.2. Following, in Section 2.3,
different protocols for privacy preserving online chats and online
social networks are analyzed, whether they are secure against the
leakages. In Section 3, protocols are presented to achieve secure
communication. These protocols are used to construct a privacy
preserving OSNwith encrypted communication. For the presented
OSN, then, the privacy preserving functionalities are analyzed and
compared to the previously found leakages in Section 3.5. Finally,
Section ?? concludes the work and gives an outlook on future work.
2 RELATED WORK
2.1 Privacy Analysis in Online Social Networks
The attributes users post in their profiles in a OSN can be used to
predict the attributes of other users, according to [16]. The dataset
of the Rice University network and the New Orleans Facebook
dataset were used. One of the findings was, that friends are likely
to share common attributes and these common attributes form
groups. Using these findings, on the one hand, it is possible to pre-
dict social circles of users. Using the social circles it is, on the other
hand, possible to predict attributes of users.
In [22] two datasets of theOnline Social Networks Flickr and Last.fm,
and in [1] three different datasets of Flickr, Last.fm, and aNobii
were analyzed to predict social links. In these OSNs users can com-
municate with each other, form groups (of similar topics), create
links to other users, and use tags to annotate contents, such as
shared pictures. Various observations were made: users that have
more contacts tend to be more active regarding tagging and mem-
bership of groups, assortative mixing of nodes in the OSNs was de-
tected, and different patterns of topic similarity between neighbors
were found. For assortative mixing, i.e. the observation, that nodes
tend to be linked to nodes with similar properties, different proper-
ties were investigated, for example the degree of nodes, especially
the nearest neighbors degree, average number of tags of nearest
neighbors, or average amount of groups. Using these observations
similarity between users was calculated to predict social links with
high accuracy.
Privacy leakage through metadata of decentraliced OSNs was ex-
amined in [11]. Different adversaries with distinct possibilities to
access the data were considered. In a centralized setting the ser-
vice provider could combine all of them. From the metadata of
stored content different observations are possible. The size of an
object is an indicator for the type, as text is smaller than images
or videos. From the structure of a group of elements conclusions
can be drawn, e.g. amount of images in a shared album. The modi-
fication history of an object can reveal information, e.g. about user
status updates or intensity of activity. Other informations can be
obtained from access control mechanisms, like encryption head-
ers. Here, header sizes can allow estimating the number of encryp-
tion keys. Adding encryption keys or revoking them, can lead to
re-encryption of contents and can allow to draw conclusions about
changes in the relations between users. From re-using the same key
for different objects one can learn about overlapping access rights.
The communication flow can lead tomore information. From track-
ing IP addresses conclusions about online times or working habits
can be drawn, using geo-ip mapping services routes, locations, and
travelling information can be tracked. Access logs from shared con-
tent can be used to determine user-groups, ownership, and access
patterns. Timing information may be obtained from newly created
objects and (re-)distribution of keys. Different control-operations,
like login, adding friends, or searches can be observed.
Metadata of Twitter was analyzed in [19]. A post in Twitter con-
tains 144fields ofmetadatawhich allow drawing conclusions about
the owner of such a post, without considering the actual content
of the post. Using machine learning approaches owners of posts
can be identified from a group of 10.000 users with 96.7% accuracy.
Identifying social circles from network structure and user profile
informationwas the task in [15]. Usingmachine learning approaches,
amodel was created that accurately identified social circles in Face-
book, Google+, and Twitter.
Patterns in user behavior can be recognized even with encrypted
traffic. In [5] encrypted traffic of different sequences of actions
were collected for popular Android apps. A sample sequence for
the Facebook app was to tap on the button to write a post, fill the
textbox with some random text, and post this message. Analyzing
the network flow as set of time series it was possible to predict
different patterns even with TLS/SSL encrypted traffic.
2.2 Privacy Leakages
From the findings in Section 2.1 the following list summarizes pos-
sible problems when metadata can be accessed in an Online Social
Network where communication is end-to-end encrypted. Single
problems may not neccessarily lead to privacy leakages, but the
combinations of different problems can lead to severe violations of
privacy.
• Structure of Network (NS)
– Degree of Node (NS1) - How many contacts does a user
have?
– Neighbors of Node (NS2) - Howmany contacts do the con-
tacts of a user have?
• Structure of Data (DS)
– Count of Objects, Groups, Keys, . . . (DS1) - How many
contacts, posts, . . . does a user, group, . . . have?
– Common Objects, Groups, Keys, . . . (DS2) - Which con-
tacts, posts, comments, . . . are common between users,
groups, . . . ?
– Size of Objects or Groups (DS3) - What is the type of an
object (text, media, . . . ), how many users are in a group?
– History of Objects or Groups (DS4) - How often does an
object or group change?
• Timing (T )
– Time Series Pattern (T1) - Are objects or keys accessed in
a specific order, especially with a specific timing?
– Timing for Creating Objects and Distributing Keys (T2) -
Which keys are associated with which objects?
– Key Distribution and Re-Encryption (T3) - Which keys
are associatedwithwhich objects andwhich keys are added
or removed when objects are changed?
• Control Information (CI )
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– IP Address Logging (CI1) - Track user behavior when the
same IP accesses content, or different IP addresses access
the same content, especially when the time of day is the
same across different days.
– Geo-IP Mapping (CI2) - Where is a user, which locations
are associated with a user?
– Access Logs for Objects, Groups, or Ownership (CI3) -
Which user accesses which objects, groups, . . . ?
– Control Messages and Queries for Login, Friend Request,
or Searches (CI4) - What is a user doing in the OSN?
2.3 Privacy Preserving Online Social Networks
There is a various number of schemes that introduce encryption of
messages between two or more participants. Some of the schemes
are designed for emails, others are designed especially for online
message services. Most of the schemes rely on a client-server struc-
ture, but there are peer-to-peer approaches, as well:
A scheme for encrypted online chats is Off-the-record (OTR) [18].
The scheme uses new session keys 푘푖 for each message 푖 . Each
key is negotiated through a Diffie-Hellman key exchange between
two participants 퐴, 퐵 with keys 푥퐴푖 , 푥퐵푖 , where keys 푥푧푖 , 푥푧 푗 for
푧 ∈ {퐴, 퐵}, 푖 ≠ 푗 are independent. This introduces perfect forward
secrecy for the communication. Possible leakage vectors could be:
DS3and T1 because an adversary could track the sizes and sending
times of messages. When a dedicated server is used for the com-
munication, additionally, NS, CI1, and CI2 can be exploited by the
server.
A peer-to-peer system for end-to-end encryptedmessages between
two participants was Silent Circle InstantMessaging Protocol (SCIMP) [17].
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellmanwas used to agree on a shared key for
encrypted messages. As SCIMP was a peer-to-peer approach all
leakages utilizing a server where mitigated, still the leakage vec-
tors NS, DS and CI could be exploited by a service provider or an-
other malicious relay.
Private Facebook Chat (PFC) [20] introduced end-to-end encrypted
chats inside Facebook. The key distribution works by dedicated
servers, that use the Facebook authentication mechanisms. Nearly
all leakage vectors seem exploitable, except for T2 and T3. No mat-
ter, whether the Facebook servers or the PFC servers are consid-
ered, because an adversary on either of the servers can access all
metadata.
Multiple peers can communicate securely using the approach de-
scribed in [12]. A modified Diffie-Hellman protocol is used to find
a common secret for the participants with the help of a server. The
leakage vectors NS, DS and CI can possibly be exploited, because
a server is used to manage the communication and keys.
A comparable approach is discussed in [27]. Here, elliptic curve
Diffie-Hellman is used for the key agreement. Therefore, the same
leakage vectors NS, DS and CI can possibly be exploited.
In the Signal protocol [14] a shared secret between participants
is derived from a key chain. The inputs for this chain are found
through a modifiedDiffie-Hellman key exchange. Messages are en-
crypted and new keys are used for every message. Still, the leakage
vectors NS, DS and CI are possible, when the server is attacked.
Threema [25] allows end-to-end encryption of messages. Commu-
nication between two peers is encrypted using a shared key. Mes-
sages in groups are encrypted for each peer individually, using
their public keys. Larger files are encrypted using a symmetric key,
which is encrypted with each participant’s public key. When the
server is attacked, all leakage vectors NS, DS, T, and CIcould be
exploited.
Another end-to-end encrypted online chat is presented in [23].Mes-
sages are encrypted using symmetric AES encryption. The necces-
sary keys are encrypted for all participants of a chat using their
public RSA keys. A chat can contain arbitratily many participants
and the amount of participants can be changed, then new AES keys
are generated and distributed. There are various possible leakage
vectors, when the server is attacked: all from NS, DS, CI, and T,
because all neccessary data to manage the OSN are stored in plain-
text on the server.
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [10] and S/MIME [21] are methods for
the encryption of emails. In both, public key encryption is used to
encrypt a symmetric key for every recipient of an email. The con-
tent of an email is encrypted, using the symmetric key. All follow-
ing answers use the same keys. The main difference is in the verifi-
cation of public keys: PGP constructs a trust system between par-
ticipants, whereas S/MIME uses X.509 certificates. Possible leakage
vectors are: NS and DS, because recipients are known in plaintext.
Leakages from CI are possible, if the adversary is one of the in-
volved mail servers.
Other approaches introduce privacy into Online Social Networks:
FlyByNight [13] introduces client-side based encryption of content
for Facebook. Each user has a password that is used to encrypt a
private key for the key database of the system. Messages between
participants are encrypted using their public keys. Proxy cryptog-
raphy is used when more than two participants communicate. As
flyByNight is an extension to Facebook all leakage vectors could be
used when considering their servers. When considering only the
servers of flyByNight, still, NS, T, CI, DS1, and DS3 could be used,
because the server manages all keys and messages. A decentral-
ized OSN is Safebook [7]. Social circles from the real life are used
to construct trust relationships. Each node is surrounded by those
structures, which are called matryoshkas. This is used to provide
data storage and communication privacy. Another layer is a peer-
to-peer network that enables application services, such as lookup.
The internet is the transport layer in the scheme. Because of the
peer-to-peer approach, most of the leakages are prevented, or at
least very unlikely. E.g. to exploit NS, DS, or T, the trusted peers
have to attack the user. Attacks through CI are unlikely because of
the peer-to-peer structure.
In [6] another decentralized OSN is presented. Again, real life trust
relationships are utilized for trustworthy connections within the
network. Multihop routing between trusted peers is used as an
anonymization technique. Privacy leakages are unlikely, because
for NS, DS, or T trusted peers have to attack the user.
In the OSN Persona [2] users define who can access their infor-
mation. Attribute-based encryption is used to share secrets within
groups of participants that have at least one attribute in common.
Further, each user owns a key-pair, such that the public key can be
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used to encrypt content specifically for this user. Although com-
munication data is encrypted, various usable metadata may accu-
mulate on the server, therefore, exploits of NS, DS, T, and CI seem
possible.
Snake[3] is an OSN which is written in HTML5 and JavaScript. It
uses the WebCrypto API to encrypt messages between peers. One
can not conclude which peers communicate, because addresses are
masked inside the database. When users establish a friendship they
agree on a shared key, and addresses to send and receive messages.
These addresses change with every new message. Therefore, ex-
ploitingNS andDS seems to be not possible, when considering com-
munication between peers, but T and CI could be exploited. When
a user logs in the server has to prove the neccessary encrypted data
and exploits of DS1, DS3, and DS4 can be possible.
2.4 Mix Networks
In [4] mix networks are presented. A mix network is a routing
protocol where a message is sent to a proxy, called mix, that for-
wards the message to another mix or the recipient. When layered
encryption is used between the participants the path of a message
becomes hard to trace. This allows to achieve anonymity of the
sender, of the recipient, or both. Consider a network with sender
푆 , recipient 푅, and mixes 푀1, 푀2, . . . , 푀푛 with public encryption
keys 푠, 푟 ,푚1,푚2, . . . ,푚푛 and a message 푁 .
Anonymity of the sender is achieved by encrypting the message
to 푛 = {{{{푁 }푟 }푚푛 . . . }푚2 }푚1 . 푛 is sent to 푀1, who decrypts the
message and forwards it to푀2, and so on. Finally, 푅 receives {푛}푟
from 푀푛 . Because each recipient of the message only knows the
participant before, and after, the flow of the message is concealed
and 푅 does not get to know that 푆 was the sender.
Anonymity of the recipient is provided, when the recipient gen-
erates a return address. The return address is an encrypted se-
quence of mixes that the sender has to use, where only the first
mix is known to the sender. The recipient sends this sequence to
the sender, via the mix network.
By combining both schemes, both, sender and recipient of a mes-
sage can remain anonymous to each other.
Different methods are needed, that outsiders cannot track mes-
sages through a mix network, such as removing of duplicate mes-
sages. This would allow an attacker to find a connection between
a received message and the next mix, because the duplicate has
to be sent to the exact same receiver. Further, messages have to
be modified by a mix to prevent comparing incoming with outgo-
ing messages. Additionally, messages at a mix have to be collected
and either forwarded at random or together with other messages
and the forwarding procedure has to produce a different ordering
of messages. In Figure 1 a mix network is displayed, where three
nodes send messages via two mixes.
3 PROPOSED PROTOCOLS
The following protocols ensure private communication within a
Online Social Network, based on a client-server architecture. No
metadata is leakedwhen users communicate. This is achieved through
concealed communication channels.
node 1 node 2 node 3
mix 1
mix 2
node 1
푚′′′5
node 2
푚′′′2
node 3
푚′′′1 ,푚
′′′
3 ,푚
′′′
4
푚1,푚2,푚3 푚4 푚5
푚′3,푚
′
1,푚
′
4,푚
′
5,푚
′
2
푚′′5 푚
′′
2
푚′′3 ,푚
′′
1 ,푚
′′
4
Figure 1: A mix network. The nodes send encrypted mes-
sages to a mix. The mix collects multiple messages, re-
orders them, decrypts them the first time and determines
the next mix, then the messages are forwarded to the next
mix.Again, themessages are collected, reordered, decrypted,
and forwarded to the receiver, which then, decrypts them
the last time.
3.1 A Concealed Secure Channel
In a client-server model a concealed channel between two clients
uses the server. Such a channel can be created when one of the
clients has a concealed channel to an address on the server, which
is known to the other client and accessed through a concealed
channel. This address is called concealed address.
Definition 1 (Concealed Address). A concealed address is a
tuple (푐, 푝푅, 푝푊 , 푝푂 ), where 푐 is a unique address at the server. 푝푅, 푝푊 , 푝푂
are values to prove that one is allowed to read or write messages to
this address, or that one is the owner of the address.
A client can create a concealed address by sending a CreateAd-
dress-Message to the server. The concealed address provides an ad-
dress on the server where clients can read messages from or write
messages to if the according proofs are provided. Another proof
determines ownership of the concealed address. This means there
are three corresponding values, called address keys for a concealed
address: 푝푅 , 푝푊 , and 푝푂 .
Definition 2 (Address Key). An address key is a value 푝푋 ∈ G,
where 푋 ∈ {푅,푊 ,푂} and G is a finite cyclical group of primal order
푞 with a generator 푔, such that 푝푋 = 푔
푥 mod 푞, with 푥 ∈ N. The
address key can have a wildcard-value ∗, when 푥 = 0.
Clients can prove that they are allowed to read messages from
the concealed address by using the 푝푅 value, which is called read ad-
dress key. 푝푊 , the write address key, is used to verify if a client is al-
lowed to write messages to it. It can be proven that the client is the
owner using the owner address key푝푂 . For the verification whether
a client is allowed to read messages the server generates two ran-
domvalues푚푅, 푟푅 and computes 푐0 ≡ 푔
푟푅 mod 푞 and 푐1 ≡ 푔
푅푟푅 ·푚푅 mod 푞.
푐0, 푐1 are provided to the client. If the client can calculate푚푅 ≡
푐1
푐
푟푅
0
≡
푔푅푟푅 ·푚푅
푔푅푟푅
mod 푞
he is allowed to receive the messages from the server. The proce-
dure, see Algorithm 1, is the same for proving the permission to
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write to the address or proving ownership of the concealed address.
The proof, that a client is allowed to read or write messages to a
concealed address is only a verification against the server. The other
clients, that write messages to the concealed address or read mes-
sages from it, may use a key for the encryption and decryption of
messages, which is unknown to the user. This key is called content
key.
Definition 3 (Message Key). A content key is a value 푘 , which
is used as a symmetric key for the encryption and decryption of mes-
sages stored at a concealed address.
The content key and address keys are independent from each
other. They can be negotiated between the participants or distributed
in person and later changed betweenmessages. Usingmultiple con-
cealed addresses concealed communication channels, comparable
to a mix network (see Section 2.4), can be established. A partici-
pant of the OSN, that wants to provide a mix network generates
multiple concealed addresses, where the write address keys are ∗.
This allows everybody knowing the addresses to write messages
to it. When the messages are encrypted with, either the public key
of the mix or a symmetric key, only known to the mix and the
sender, they can be decrypted by the mix, only. These messages,
then, contain another encrypted message for another mix or a re-
cipient and an address, where it has to be written to. Messages are
collected by the mix, decrypted, reordered, merged if possible, and
then written to the specified addresses. Messages can be merged,
when they have the same target address. Then, they are concate-
nated and written as a single message. For increased security, du-
plicate messages are deleted. Using this construction, a communi-
cation between a sender and a receiver can be established, where
the sender is anonymous, or the receiver is anonymous, or both
are anonymous to each other. An exemplary message flow is de-
picted in Algorithm 3. To reduce the amount of messages stored
to the server, mixes can delete messages, after they are forwarded.
However, to prevent attacks with duplicate messages, the mixes
have to wait a certain amount of time, depending on how many
messages they receive and have to forward. When a path is used
that achieves anonymity of the sender, this anonymous sender can
prove ownership of an address to the server. This allows partici-
pants of the OSN to exchange addresses. E.g. a user 퐴 can create a
concealed address 푐퐴 with some address keys. 퐴 can send the owner
address key via a concealed channel to 퐵. Then, 퐵 can prove own-
ership of the concealed address, via another concealed channel. Ex-
changing concealed addresses between users and mixes cannot be
tracked by the server or another user.
3.2 User Information and Postings
Sharing personal user information, like the date of birth or resi-
dence, is part of social networking. In many OSNs users can create
profiles to share such user information. In our approach it is possi-
ble to create a user profile using concealed addresses. The user can
decide, how the profile is stored at the server: a user profile can con-
sist of a single concealed address, containing all the information a
user wants to share. This information can be encrypted or stored
as plaintext at the concealed address. The user then decides who re-
ceives the concealed address, the read address key, and, in case of en-
crypted information, who receives the content key. Storing the user
Algorithm 1 This algorithm is used to verify that a client is al-
lowed to read messages from a concealed address. The value 푝푅 ≡
푔푅 mod 푞 is known to the server, 푅 is a private key, that is only
known to authorized clients. The verification procedure for writ-
ing messages or claiming the ownership over the concealed ad-
dressworks similar. Here the values 푝푊 ≡ 푔
푊 mod 푞 and 푝푂 ≡ 푔
푂
mod 푞 are used,where푊,푂 are private keys. Possible messages for
Step 1, are shown in Table 1.
1. Client sends ReadAddress(푐) from concealed address푐
If 풑푹 = ∗:
2a. sends messages in concealed address
terminates.
If 풑푹 ≠ ∗:
2b. Server chooses random푚푅 and 푟푅
calculates 푐0 ≡ 푔
푟푅 mod 푞
calculates 푐1 ≡ 푝푅
푟푅 ·푚푅 mod 푞
sends (푐0, 푐1) to the client
If client knows 푹:
3b.a.Client calculates푚푅 ≡
푐1
푐
푟푅
0
≡
푔푅
푟푅 ·푚푅
푔푅
푟푅
mod 푞
sends푚푅 to the server
4b.a. Server sends messages in concealed address
terminates.
If client does not know 푹:
3b.b.Client sends another value
4b.b.Server denies access
terminates.
Table 1: Possible messages a user can send to the server to
create, update, read or write concealed addresses.
Type Description
CreateAddress(푘) Creates a new concealed ad-
dress, communication between
the client and the server are
encrypted using the key 푘
UpdateAddress(푐 ,푅,푊 ,푂) Updates a concealed address 푐
with 푅,푊 ,푂 are parameters for
proofs for reading, writing, and
ownership
ReadAddress(푐) Reads messages from the con-
cealed address 푐
WriteAddress(푐 ,푚) Writes a new (encrypted) mes-
sage푚 to a concealed address푐
profile as a whole at the server is possible but not recommended:
on the one hand, a user has to update the whole profile, when some
information is changed. On the other hand, no fine-grained access
rights can be defined. Then, a user cannot share some of the infor-
mation with everybody public, while other information is shared
with specific contacts, only. To achieve this, a user can create a
concealed address, where the read address key is ∗. This concealed
address is used to store all addresses of the profile information, like
a concealed address containing the public keys of the user, so other
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Algorithm 2 This algorithm is used to create a new concealed ad-
dress. The values 푟,푤, 표, chosen by the server are replaced by values
known to the client only.
1. Client creates a new symmetric key 푘 for encryption
sends CreateAddress(푘)
2. Server creates new address 푐 , chooses random 푟,푤, 표
calculates 푝푅 ≡ 푔
푟 mod 푞푝푊 ≡ 푔
푤 mod 푞, 푝푂 ≡
푔표 mod 푞
encrypts (푐, 푝푅, 푝푊 , 푝푂 ) with 푘 to {푐, 푝푅, 푝푊 , 푝푂 }푘
sends {푐, 푝푅, 푝푊 , 푝푂 }푘
3. Client decrypts {푐, 푝푅, 푝푊 , 푝푂 }푘
chooses random 푅′ and calculates calculates 푝 ′
푅
≡
푔푅
′
mod 푞 or sets 푝푅 = ∗
chooses random푊 ′ and calculates calculates 푝 ′
푊
≡
푔푊
′
mod 푞 or sets 푝푊 = ∗
chooses random 푂 ′ and calculates calculates 푝 ′
푂
≡
푔푂
′
mod 푞 or sets 푝푂 = ∗
sends UpdateAddress(푐 ,푝 ′
푅
, 푝 ′
푊
, 푝 ′
푂
)
4. Server verification procedure according to Algorithm 1
If proof is incorrect:
5a. Server sends Error-Message, terminates
If proof is correct:
5b. Server stores (푐, 푝 ′
푅
, 푝 ′
푊
, 푝 ′
푂
), sends AddressCreated(푐).
terminates
Algorithm 3 The sender 푆 wants to send a message 푚 to the
recipient 푅, with address 푐푅 and public key 푟 . The addresses
푐푖,1, 푐푖,2, . . . , 푐푖, 푗 of mix 푀푖 with public key 푚푖 and are known to
푆 .
1. Sender 푺 encrypts푚 to푚′ = {푚}푟
chooses random 푙
creates list destinations = (푅)
For 1 to 풍 do:
sets receiver = last element of destinations
sets dest = address of receiver
creates message 푚 = (message : 푚′, destination :
dest)
chooses random푀푖
appends푀푖 to destinations
encrypts푚 to푚′ = {푚}푚푖
EndFor
sends 푚′ to the address of the last element of
destinations
2. Mix decrypts푚′ to (message :푚′, destination : dest)
sends푚′ to dest
3. ...
4. Receiverdecrypts푚′ to푚
users can verify signatures or send encrypted messages, another
concealed address for the date of birth, another concealed address for
the residence, and so on. Then each linked concealed address can
have a unique address key. To make the tracking of user informa-
tion through linked addresses difficult, each linked address itself
can contain another linked address, which is encrypted. This pre-
vents an adversary from learning which addresses are connected.
A user may want to share postings. These can contain personal ex-
perience, for example, pictures from the last holidays. This infor-
mation can be stored at the user profile, like personal information,
or the user can link a single, or multiple concealed addresses. Each
address can contain a list of posts. This allows the user to create dif-
ferent information feeds, where each feed can have different keys,
and therefore different access rights.
The construction of a user profile using concealed addresses allows
not only to post personal profile information and user posts, but
any type of information: the user may share a calender with fine
grained access control over each appointment, different blogs or
vlogs, picture albums, or wikis. The user can create different con-
cealed addresses, where the write address key is ∗. These addresses
work as different pinboards, where other users can post messages
visible to the user and everybody knowing the correct read address
key. Further, the user can use private concealed addresses to store
notes, bookmarks, or other private information, like passwords.
For every information the user can create a new concealed address,
a new address key, and a content key to be able to define the ac-
cess rights every time. Using concealed addresses, the user is able
to create collections of keys. These collections can be shared with
single users or with groups of users. An exemplary user profile is
displayed in Figure 2.
3.3 Personal Messages and Group Messages
Personal messages or group messages are possible between two
or multiple participants. One user creates a concealed address and
shares the read address key andwrite address key with the other par-
ticipants. The content key can be chosen by this user and shared, us-
ing the public keys of the other participants. Then, the participants
can write messages to this concealed address and read the incom-
ing messages. Whenever a new participant is added to a chat the
read address key, write address key, and content key is shared with
this user, via an encrypted message, using the public key. When a
user is removed from the chat the owner of the address, knowing
the owner address key, has to change the read address key and write
address key, and a new content key is generated and shared with
the remaining participants.
3.4 Groups
A group in an OSN is a collection of informations, messages, posts,
pictures, etc., comparable to a user profile, with the difference, that
everything in the group may be accessed by multiple users. Addi-
tionally, some parts of the group my be changed by some partic-
ipants. A group can be constructed like a user profile. One con-
cealed address is used as a collection of different linked concealed
addresses, containing the different information shared in the group.
Because each concealed address can have a unique key, again a fine
grained access system can be created, where some information in
the group can be accessed by allmembers of the group, where other
information is hidden to some members. At some addresses, mem-
bers of the group can add or edit information, at other addresses
only a specified group of administrators of the group can change
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(a6ebc5, ∗, g9050e7, gfe3485)
0 Name: Sample User
1 Public key: yFpQlYLlx3eiTJ29
2 {Date of Birth: address: e211fb}1c031a, key: 푘1
3 {Residence: address: 85cd71}1c031a, key: 푘1
4 {School: address: 4f8e3d}b9f1cf, key: 푘2
5 {Contactlist 1: address: 54deaf}8eaeeb, key: 푘3
6 {Contactlist 2: address: 777c9d}3312cd, key: 푘4
7 {Postings: address: 76703f}1c031a, key: 푘1
8 {Keys: address: a9a7d6, key: 418530}6770da
9 . . .
(a9a7d6, g418530, g271812, gc18a4c)
0 {keyId: 푘1 address: 8c5620 key: dd11e5}418530
1 {keyId: 푘2 address: 65889b key: 57b042}418530
2 {keyId: 푘3 address: b66f9a key: def981}418530
3 {keyId: 푘4 address: 300a03 key: b451cc}418530
4 . . .
(8c5620, gdd11e5, gb1a72d, g8eb72e)
0 {user: 7c5d03 key: 1c031a}4209d1
1 {user: f0d082 key: 1c031a}c7b3df
2 {user: 74344e key: 1c031a}c35fb0
3 . . .
(76703f, g1c031a, g9d30eb, g897047)
0 {address: a59f4a key: 161995}1c031a
(a59f4a, g161995, gddd5d9, g517f14)
0 {content: "posting content"}1c031a , key: 푘1
1 {content: "posting content"}75fb62 , key: 푘5
2 {content: "posting content"}1c031a , key: 푘1
3 {content: "posting content"}1c031a , key: 푘1
4 . . .
Figure 2: A user profile solely relying on concealed addresses. The construction allows a user to hide its personal information,
except for the name. The fields are encrypted using keys푘1, . . . , 푘4, which are stored in a concealed address, which is not directly,
i.e. in plaintext, linked from the profile.When a user receives the key 6770푑푎, it can decrypt the entry containing the keys. Then,
the concealed address, with the keys can be accessed. Each key, then, is encrypted, using a user-specific key. Using these keys,
the fields from the profile can be decrypted and their concealed addresses can be read.
information. The necessary keys, can be shared between the autho-
rized users, via personal messages or via shared concealed addresses.
The construction of groups and user profiles, using concealed ad-
dresses, allows users to join groups, without exposing their infor-
mation. Then, they just read the concealed addresses of that specific
group. When users want to be visible within the group, they can
publish their profile’s address or their name, together with a signa-
ture, within the group.
3.5 Finding and Verifying Participants,
Exchanging Keys
A user has the freedom in constructing a profile, such that no other
user can find him. This can be achieved, when no profile informa-
tion is published, or all of the profile fields are encrypted by the
user. Further, if a user has encrypted profile fields, these cannot be
found through the OSN. An attribute-based search for participants
can be prevented. Nevertheless, when a user publishes some fields,
an attribute-based search is possible.When a user does not want to
be found through the OSN the only way to find him is by receiving
the needed concealed addresses and keys through a different chan-
nel. A channel can be via phone or by meeting in person. The user
can generate a fingerprint, like a QR code or a textual represen-
tation of the concealed addresses and keys via a method described
in [9].
This method can be used to verify public keys of users, as well:
when participants 퐴 and 퐵 want to verify their keys, they call a
procedure that concatenates all the public keys of퐴 and 퐵 in a pre-
defined order, like by ascending id of the public keys. Then a fin-
gerprint is generated by both users 퐴 and 퐵 and compared. When
both fingerprints are equal, they can be sure that the public keys
are equal and no third party has injected a false key. When 퐴 and
퐵 trust each other, they can use this procedure to verify keys of
other participants, as well, and construct a web of trust this way.
This procedure is displayed in Figure 3. As soon as two partici-
pants have established a trusted connection they can exchange en-
crypted messages through a concealed address. This allows them
to further exchange and verify keys. When users have a verified
concealed address to exchange messages they can work as mixes
for each other. By forwarding messages to other mixes, or partici-
pants of the OSN.
When a user created a profile comparable to Figure 2, other users
can find him through the OSN, because the server can read the
Name-entry in the profile address, because the concealed address can
be read by anybody and the entry is not encrypted. A similar public
field can be used in groups, or by mixes, as well.
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User 푨
Own Public Keys:
¤퐴 : ba9c31, Ò퐴 : 0c54f8
Other Public Keys:
¤퐵 : 306d70, Ò퐵 : 98996b
¤퐶 : ee3921, Ò퐶 : ac6700
user
ba9c31.0c54f8.306d70.98996b.ee3921.ac6700
"stars venus black"
concatenates keys in fixed order
generates fingerprint
User 푩
Own Public Keys:
¤퐵 : 306d70, Ò퐵 : 98996b
Other Public Keys:
¤퐴 : ba9c31, Ò퐴 : 0c54f8
¤퐶 : ee3921, Ò퐶 : ac6700
user
ba9c31.0c54f8.306d70.98996b.ee3921.ac6700
"stars venus black"
concatenates keys in fixed order
generates fingerprint
compare
fingerprints
Figure 3: Users퐴 and 퐵 verify their keys. Both users concatenate the public keys in a fixed order, like using ascending ids, then
fingerprints are generated. Both fingerprints are compared via a secure channel, like meeting in public. If both fingerprints
are equal퐴 and 퐵 know that their communication is secure.
4 CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a summary of different possible privacy leak-
ages within secure online social networks and a discussionwhether
different approaches for privacy preserving OSNs are possibly vul-
nerable to these leakages. Either, the OSNs are possibly vulnerable
or are using a peer-to-peer architecture. Therefore, we presented
a way to construct privacy preserving, encrypted, concealed chan-
nels in a client-server architecture. No evaluable metadata is gener-
atedwhen using these channels, according to the previous findings
of possible privacy leakages. Using these concealed communica-
tion channels different protocols are presented to provide the full
functionality of OSNs. These functionalities contain: a user profile,
where profile fields, contact lists, pinboards, etc. can be enrypted
and hidden for the server, an attacker, or any third party. Further,
private messages between two or more participants of the OSN
are provided. Another presented functionality are groups. A group
can contain message boards, calendars, pinboards, etc. The groups
can be accessed by multiple participants. Some of the participants
may be only able to read contents, whereas, other participants can
produce contents and publish them in a group. Protocols to verify
public keys via a secure channel are discussed, as well as the inter-
change of concealed addresses.
One of the main advantages of the OSN, however, can be consid-
ered as the main weakpoints as well: profile information or con-
cealed channels can be hidden from the server, to prevent the server
or a third party from evaluating this information. On the other
hand, this prevents any user from searching these informations
through the server. This means that two participants have to meet
via a different channel in order to exchange the information they
need in order to ultimately be able to conduct a private communi-
cation via the OSN. However, once this hurdle has been overcome,
any further verification of other OSN participants can also take
place via this communication channel. Further research, therefore,
may address this point to make the OSN a bit more user-friendly.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors acknowledge the financial support by the Federal Min-
istry of Education and Research of Germany in the framework of
SoNaTe (project number 16SV7405).
REFERENCES
[1] Luca Maria Aiello, Alain Barrat, Rossano Schifanella, Ciro Cattuto, Benjamin
Markines, and Filippo Menczer. 2012. Friendship Prediction and Homophily
in Social Media. ACM Trans. Web 6, 2, Article 9 (June 2012), 33 pages.
https://doi.org/10.1145/2180861.2180866
[2] Randy Baden, Adam Bender, Neil Spring, Bobby Bhattacharjee, and Daniel
Starin. 2009. Persona: an online social network with user-defined privacy. In
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2009 conference on Data communication. 135–
146.
[3] Alessandro Barenghi, Michele Beretta, Alessandro Di Federico, and Gerardo
Pelosi. 2014. Snake: An end-to-end encrypted online social network. In 2014
IEEE Intl Conf on High Performance Computing and Communications, 2014 IEEE
6th Intl Symp on Cyberspace Safety and Security, 2014 IEEE 11th Intl Conf on Em-
bedded Software and Syst (HPCC, CSS, ICESS). IEEE, 763–770.
[4] David L Chaum. 1981. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital
pseudonyms. Commun. ACM 24, 2 (1981), 84–90.
[5] M. Conti, L. V. Mancini, R. Spolaor, and N. V. Verde. 2016. Analyzing Android
Encrypted Network Traffic to Identify User Actions. IEEE Transactions on Infor-
mation Forensics and Security 11, 1 (2016), 114–125.
[6] Leucio Antonio Cutillo, Refik Molva, and Thorsten Strufe. 2009. Privacy pre-
serving social networking through decentralization. In 2009 Sixth International
Conference onWireless On-DemandNetwork Systems and Services. IEEE, 145–152.
[7] L. A. Cutillo, R. Molva, and T. Strufe. 2009. Safebook: A privacy-preserving on-
line social network leveraging on real-life trust. IEEE CommunicationsMagazine
47, 12 (Dec 2009), 94–101. https://doi.org/10.1109/MCOM.2009.5350374
[8] Andrea De Salve, Roberto Di Pietro, Paolo Mori, and Laura Ricci. 2017. A logi-
cal key hierarchy based approach to preserve content privacy in decentralized
online social networks. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
(2017).
[9] Sergej Dechand, Dominik Schürmann, Karoline Busse, Yasemin Acar, Sascha
Fahl, and Matthew Smith. 2016. An empirical study of textual key-fingerprint
representations. In 25th {USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security 16).
193–208.
[10] Hal Finney, Lutz Donnerhacke, Jon Callas, Rodney L. Thayer, and David Shaw.
2007. OpenPGP Message Format. RFC 4880. https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC4880
[11] B. Greschbach, G. Kreitz, and S. Buchegger. 2012. The devil is in the meta-
data — New privacy challenges in Decentralised Online Social Networks. In
2012 IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications
Workshops. 333–339.
[12] Hiroaki Kikuchi, Minako Tada, and Shohachiro Nakanishi. 2004. Secure instant
messaging protocol preserving confidentiality against administrator. In 18th In-
ternational Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications,
2004. AINA 2004., Vol. 2. IEEE, 27–30.
[13] Matthew M. Lucas and Nikita Borisov. 2008. FlyByNight: Mitigating the Privacy
Risks of Social Networking. In Proceedings of the 7th ACM Workshop on Privacy
Concealed Communication in Online Social Networks Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA
in the Electronic Society (Alexandria, Virginia, USA) (WPES ’08). ACM, New York,
NY, USA, 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1145/1456403.1456405
[14] Moxie Marlinspike. 2016. The Double Ratchet Algorithm.
https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/
[15] Julian Mcauley and Jure Leskovec. 2014. Discovering Social Circles in Ego Net-
works. ACM Trans. Knowl. Discov. Data 8, 1, Article 4 (Feb. 2014), 28 pages.
https://doi.org/10.1145/2556612
[16] Alan Mislove, Bimal Viswanath, Krishna P. Gummadi, and Peter Druschel. 2010.
You Are Who You Know: Inferring User Profiles in Online Social Networks. In
Proceedings of the Third ACM International Conference on Web Search and Data
Mining (New York, NewYork, USA) (WSDM ’10). Association for ComputingMa-
chinery, New York, NY, USA, 251–260. https://doi.org/10.1145/1718487.1718519
[17] Vinnie Moscaritolo, Gary Belvin, and Phil Zimmermann. 2012.
Silent Circle Instant Messaging Protocol - Protocol Specification.
https://web.archive.org/web/20150402122917/https://silentcircle.com/sites/default/themes/silentcircle/assets/downloads/SCIMP_paper.pdf
[18] OTR Development Team. 2012. Off-the-Record Messaging Protocol version 3.
https://otr.cypherpunks.ca/Protocol-v3-4.1.1.html
[19] Beatrice Perez, Mirco Musolesi, and Gianluca Stringhini. 2018. You are
your Metadata: Identification and Obfuscation of Social Media Users us-
ing Metadata Information. CoRR abs/1803.10133 (2018). arXiv:1803.10133
http://arxiv.org/abs/1803.10133
[20] Chris Robison, Scott Ruoti, TimothyW van der Horst, and Kent E Seamons. 2012.
Private facebook chat. In 2012 International Conference on Privacy, Security, Risk
and Trust and 2012 International Confernece on Social Computing. IEEE, 451–460.
[21] J. Schaad, B. Ramsdell, and S. Turner. 2019. Secure/Multipurpose Internet
Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 4.0 Message Specification. RFC 8551.
https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC8551
[22] Rossano Schifanella, Alain Barrat, Ciro Cattuto, Benjamin Markines, and Fil-
ippo Menczer. 2010. Folks in Folksonomies: Social Link Prediction from
Shared Metadata. In Proceedings of the Third ACM International Confer-
ence on Web Search and Data Mining (New York, New York, USA) (WSDM
’10). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 271–280.
https://doi.org/10.1145/1718487.1718521
[23] Fabian Schillinger and Christian Schindelhauer. 2019. End-to-End Encryption
Schemes for Online Social Networks. In International Conference on Security,
Privacy and Anonymity in Computation, Communication and Storage. Springer,
133–146.
[24] Gustavus J Simmons. 1988. How to (really) share a secret. In Conference on the
Theo y and Application of Cryptography. S ringer, 390–448.
[25] Threema. 2019. Threema Cryptography Whitepaper.
https://threema.ch/press-files/cryptography_whitepaper.pdf
[26] Chung Kei Wong, Mohamed Gouda, and Simon S Lam. 2000. Secure group com-
munications using key graphs. IEEE/ACM transactions on networking 8, 1 (2000),
16–30.
[27] Chung-Huang Yang, Tzong-Yih Kuo, T Ahn, and Chia-Pei Lee. 2008. Design and
implementation of a secure instant messaging service based on elliptic-curve
cryptography. Journal of Computers 18, 4 (2008), 31–38.
